Simulation-based Safety Assessment of High-level Reliability Models by Nagy, Simon József et al.
A. Fehnker and H. Garavel (Eds.):
Models for Formal Analysis of Real Systems (MARS 2020)
EPTCS 316, 2020, pp. 240–260, doi:10.4204/EPTCS.316.9
This work is licensed under the
Creative Commons Attribution License.
Simulation-based Safety Assessment of
High-level Reliability Models
Simon Jo´zsef Nagy
Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Budapest, Hungary
Department of Measurement and Information Systems
simon.jozsef.nagy@gmail.com
Bence Graics Kristo´f Marussy Andra´s Vo¨ro¨s
Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Budapest, Hungary
Department of Measurement and Information Systems
MTA-BME Lendu¨let Cyber-physical Systems Research Group
graics@mit.bme.hu marussy@mit.bme.hu vori@mit.bme.hu
Systems engineering approaches use high-level models to capture the architecture and behavior of the
system. However, when safety engineers conduct safety and reliability analysis, they have to create
formal models, such as fault-trees, according to the behavior described by the high-level engineering
models and environmental/fault assumptions. Instead of creating low-level analysis models, our
approach builds on engineering models in safety analysis by exploiting the simulation capabilities
of recent probabilistic programming and simulation advancements. Thus, it could be applied in
accordance with standards and best practices for the analysis of a critical automotive system as part of
an industrial collaboration, while leveraging high-level block diagrams and statechart models created
by engineers. We demonstrate the applicability of our approach in a case study adapted from the
automotive system from the collaboration.
1 Introduction
Safety-critical cyber-physical systems, such as embedded control systems in the automotive domain,
must satisfy numerous stringent extra-functional requirements, such as safety, reliability, and availability,
in addition to functional requirements. The ISO 26262 [16] standard for automotive systems requires
addressing these issues during system design by following recommended development practices and
demonstrating compliance. To comply with the standards and stakeholder requirements, the certification
process of the system uses top-down deductive reliability modeling and analysis of the architecture and
behaviors to verify safety properties.
Increasingly complex behaviors of embedded automotive systems, especially in the case of fault
avoidance and other safety mechanisms, pose significant challenges in these analyses. Not only classical
hardware redundancy mechanisms but also fault-tolerant sensor fusion algorithms and adaptive recon-
figuration are applied. Thus, we need expressive modeling approaches to precisely describe the system
behavior and faults, as well as tool support for calculating reliability metrics.
Our goal in this work is to use high-level statechart-based languages in the safety and reliability anal-
ysis process and support the reuse of engineering models defined in the system design phase, such as
state machines and block diagrams. Therefore, we developed an integrated automotive reliability model-
ing and analysis approach, which is able to capture the architecture and the behavior of the system using
high-level engineering models. We provide a statechart language in the Gamma framework for the engi-
neers to design not only the engineering models but also the error propagation and fault/environmental
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assumption models. Our approach exploits the simulation capabilities of recent probabilistic program-
ming and simulation advancements (e.g., [4, 8, 14, 15]), and we provide the tool support to generate the
input for these techniques. Therefore, we can calculate the compliance of the safety requirements and
also support the decision-making process in all phases of the system development process.
We demonstrate our modeling and analysis approach in the context of a safety-critical automotive
electrics and electronics (E/E) system. Nevertheless, our approach is general and may be used for other
adaptive cyber-physical systems and in other domains too.
1.1 Case study
We demonstrate our top-down modeling and analysis method in the context of a real-life example from
the automotive industry, namely on an electronic control unit (ECU) of an electronic power-assisted
steering (EPAS) unit [6] developed by Thyssenkrupp Components. Due to its critical role in the car, it
has several safety functions, including adaptive reconfiguration and high redundancy in the hardware.
In this case study, we calculate the probabilistic measures required by the ISO 26262 standards. Note
that the case study was slightly changed compared to the real system for protecting intellectual property.
However, the changes do not substantially affect its structure and behavior.
The simplified structural model of a typical, widely-used EPAS ECU is depicted in Figure 1a. It
has two microcontrollers (uC) that are separated and can operate individually. A uC has three redundant
sensors, each of which can have an operational state and two failure states, namely, Shutdown, and Drift.
If the sensor stops due to a failure, the model enters the Shutdown state, which can be detected every
time. In contrast, the Drift state represents a latent failure mode: in this state, the sensor seems to work
correctly, yet it has an erroneous output. Thus, the detection of this failure mode requires redundant
sensors and a voting mechanism. With the help of the sensors, the uCs provide the steering-actuation
functionality using a closed control loop (a safety-critical function, SCF) that must operate during the
lifetime of the car continuously.
Figure 1/b) depicts the simplified statechart1 describing the behavior of a uC. The initial state is
Normal operation. The model goes to state AssistLoss if the uC fails or all sensors fail (go to state
Shutdown). In contrast, the uC goes to state LatentError if at least two sensors have latent error as the
bad sensors will vote down the good one. Therefore, the uC will use wrong input data in the control loop,
causing the EPAS (the states of which are modeled in an evaluation statechart) to go to state Uncontrolled
self-steering. The EPAS system can fail in two ways as it can be seen in Figure 1/c):
• If both uCs go to state AssistLoss, the steering assistance will also stop operating, resulting in a
troublesome steering experience. This state of the EPAS is called Loss of assist (LoA).
• If a uC goes to state LatentError, the whole EPAS will go to state Uncontrolled self-steering (SS).
This situation is extremely dangerous and must be prevented by any means, as the driver loses
control over the car.
1 Variables in the statechart:
• drift num : number of drifted sensors
• ok num : number of normal sensors
• on num : number of sensors that seem to be working
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(a) Architecture of EPAS (b) The fault model of a uC
(c) The system states
Figure 1: Structural and behavioral models of the EPAS
1.2 Challenges of the safety analysis
In the design of complex electrics and electronics (E/E) automotive systems, practitioners are well versed
in classical top-down fault modeling with fault trees, as well as bottom-up analysis with failure modes,
effects and diagnostic analysis (FMEDA). These techniques allow demonstrating system safety accord-
ing to the applicable standards by manually creating and reviewing analysis models that are subsequently
evaluated by software tools.
However, the increasing complexity of systems, such as distributed error detection and fail-over
mechanisms in the EPAS, pose significant challenges for the classical approach.
Firstly, classical models may become very large and cumbersome to handle. For example, in the
EPAS case study, a fault tree model required 92 logic gates even after simplifying the system behavior,
while describing the full behavior and diagnostics is impossible with fault trees, as they do not support
the definition of state-based behavior. Even though there are significantly more expressive formalisms for
modeling stochastic systems [17], they often require specific expert knowledge, and cannot be applied
widely by engineers. Therefore, experts must create (either automatically or by code generation) and
review stochastic models based on high-level architecture models.
Secondly, different stochastic analyses are performed throughout the system design not only to
demonstrate safety but also to inform design decisions and fix errors. For example, Pareto and sensi-
tivity analysis find components most often responsible for safety goal violations, which are candidates
for changes. Additionally, fitting parametric distributions in Weibull analysis [1] provides information
about the product life cycle. These analyses often require purpose-built models with tailored abstrac-
tions, such as a different fault tree in the classical approach for every analysis question, which multiplies
expert effort.
Lastly, the high number of hardware and software components poses a challenge for analysis tools
due to the state space explosion. With more than four orders of magnitude difference between rare
fault modes, iterative numerical analysis methods can be rendered ineffective, while simulation-based
methods require support for rare event sampling.
These challenges made us seek an integrated modeling and analysis approach that can be applied by
engineers working on the EPAS project. At the same time, it is effective enough for answering varied
analysis questions throughout the development and certification process.
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Figure 2: Activities and artifacts in the safety assessment approach
1.3 Overview of the approach
To overcome these challenges, we created an integrated, top-down safety modeling and analysis method
(illustrated in Figure 2) for complex critical systems, such as automotive E/E components. It supports
the safety assessment of the system defined by a functional model using high-level modeling languages,
such as block diagrams and statecharts with which engineers are familiar.
The first step of our approach is the construction of the high-level reliability model, which specifies
the failure modes of the hardware components, the behavior of safety mechanisms and the propagation of
errors as interconnected statecharts. The resulting three-layered, state-based reliability model (presented
in Section 2.3) defines the possible states of the hardware components and safety mechanisms, whereas
the system configuration specifies the connections between the software components as well as their
interaction modes. Even though most of these models, such as the behavioral and structural models of
the safety mechanisms are available at the beginning of the analysis in the form of design artifacts, e.g.,
SysML state machines and internal block diagrams, some of these models have to be created during
deductive safety analysis. Thus, the same systems engineering tools can be used for creating the analysis
models that are used for the design.
Secondly, the fault distributions (presented in Section 3.3) specify the stochastic behavior of the state-
transitions in the state-based reliability model. Similarly to more traditional approaches, distributions are
obtained from standards or FMEDA analysis.
To facilitate analysis, we developed a Probabistic Runtime Environment (PRE) that processes the
high-level models for reliability analysis using the deep probabilistic programming [4] paradigm. Various
analyses can be specified as probabilistic programs, and the inference engine can handle models with
large state spaces and rare events. Therefore, we can use our analysis approach both during design with
complex analysis questions and for demonstrating system safety.
To our best knowledge, this is the first application of the deep probabilistic programming to the
reliability analysis of safety-critical systems.
2 Background and related work
2.1 Safety metrics
Critical systems have to satisfy various functional and extra-functional requirements. Dependability-
related extra-functional requirements ensure that the system provides its functionalities/services steadily.
In our paper, we focus on reliability and availability analysis. The reliability of a system represents the
continuity of the correct service [3], and the availability of a system represents readiness for the correct
service.
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During safety assessment, all these concepts have to be analyzed with several techniques, e.g., life-
time prediction, which discovers when and how the system can fail. These analysis methods can produce
several properties of the system, e.g., mean-time-to-first-failure (MTFF) and the failure-in-time (FIT).
MTTF determines the average time until the first system failure, and FIT determines the probability
of the system failure during a given period of time. To calculate these measures, deductive, top-down
analysis has to be applied.
2.2 Analysis solutions
One of the most popular deductive analysis methods is the fault tree analysis (FTA) [9]. It supports the
modeling of static systems; however, modeling components with an inner state is impossible with this
method. This poses limitations for modeling reconfigurable and self-diagnosing systems. Continuous-
time Markov-chains (CTMCs) [18] and related formalisms can model a wide range of behaviors. The
explicit solution of CTMCs is hindered by the state-space explosion, i.e., the number of states becomes
extremely large due to the complexity of the system-under-analysis. Various abstraction techniques
were developed to tackle this challenge [17], but they typically require significant modeling and analysis
expertise.
Statistical model checking methods and tools, such as UPPAAL-SMC [5] were also developed: these
approaches rely on random sampling to simulate the behavior of the system. The resulting data set
can be analyzed using standard statistical analysis methods, e.g., statistical tests and Weibull analysis
[1]. UPPAAL-SMC is widely used in the railway [21], automotive [10] and aerospace [23] domains.
Even though it can model a wide range of behaviors by providing a low-level modeling language, direct
modeling of large systems may be cumbersome. Translation from higher-level models to UPPAAL is
possible [19], but may substantially increase model size.
In addition, simulation-based approaches are also widely used for FTA in the field of nuclear power
[27], electric power distribution systems [26] and wastewater treatment [24]. The common disadvantage
of these approaches is that they have to model every failure mode and operational mode of the system
separately. As a result, they have to create a distinct fault tree for every failure mode, and they are unable
to analyze the joint distribution of the failure modes. Unfortunately, the standard statistical methods are
unable to analyze conditional models, even though they are used extensively during the safety assessment
of critical systems.
2.3 State-based modeling
State machines provide a convenient formalism to model the behavior of reactive systems. State machine
models process incoming events and react to them in accordance with their internal states. Statecharts
[12] are a popular extension of state machines providing complex constructions to support the high-
level design of reactive systems. This formalism contains several expressive modeling elements, such as
variables, arithmetic expressions, and interfaces with parametric events.
The Gamma Statechart Composition Framework2 [19] is an open-source, integrated modeling toolset
to support the semantically sound composition of heterogeneous statechart components [11]. The frame-
work reuses statechart modeling languages of third-party tools and their code generators, e.g., Mag-
icDraw3 and Yakindu Statechart Tools4, for separate components. As a core element, the framework
2http://gamma.inf.mit.bme.hu/
3https://www.nomagic.com/products/magicdraw
4https://www.itemis.com/en/yakindu/state-machine/
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provides the Gamma Composition Language, which supports the interconnection of components hier-
archically based on precise semantics. Gamma provides automated code generators as well as test case
generators for the analysis of interactions between components. Gamma also supports system-level
formal verification and validation (V&V) functionalities, i.e., the system model can be exhaustively ana-
lyzed with respect to formal requirements, by mapping statechart and composition models into the input
representations of verification back-ends.
2.4 Probabilistic programming
In order to formulate complex statistical inference problems, such as Bayesian machine learning and
differential privacy applications as computer programs, a new programming paradigm called probabilis-
tic programming has been developed, which explicitly allows sampling from probability distributions as
part of a program. In the last ten years, many tools have appeared to support this paradigm, e.g., Stan [7],
Edward [25], Anglican [2], PyMC [22] and Pyro [4].
In comparison to other tools and approaches, the greatest advantage of probabilistic programming
tools is the general inference algorithm, which can analyze conditional models and calculate posterior
distributions independently from the particular formulation of the model. These conditional models are
created by placing observe statements in the program, which define the observed (conditional) distribu-
tions of random variables. By running the probabilistic program in an inference environment, we obtain
the corresponding posterior distributions.
Most inference algorithms use a gradient-based Monte-Carlo method, such as the Hamiltonian Monte-
Carlo [8] and the No-U-Turn algorithms [15]. Recently, a new approach called deep probabilistic pro-
gramming [4] has emerged relying on deep learning algorithms for fast and efficient computations.
In this work, we relied on the stochastic variational inference algorithm (SVI) [14] from this family,
which fits a parametric distribution to the output of the probabilistic program. It optimizes the fol-
lowing evidence lower bound (ELBO) between the parametric guide function qϕ(z) and the sampled
posterior pθ (x,z) (dependent on the parameters ϕ and θ ) distribution of the output of the probabilis-
tic program, where x and z are the conditioned and latent random variables, respectively: ELBO =
Eqϕ (z)
[
log pθ (x,z)− logqϕ(z)
]
.
By choosing an appropriate guide qϕ(z) and condition x, different aspects of the program can be
analyzed. In the probabilistic programming environment Pyro [4], both the guide, the program, and the
conditions can be specified as Python programs in a user-friendly manner.
3 Modeling the EPAS ECU
3.1 State-based system modeling
Our approach introduces a fault-modeling technique based on high-level state-based (statechart) models.
We describe the system under analysis as a composition of software and hardware elements with Yakindu
statecharts and Gamma modeling languages using the Gamma Composition Framework. Statecharts
provide an expressive language to capture complex error propagation scenarios of systems. Therefore, in
our approach, we can apply statechart-based modeling (interconnected statecharts) to describe the faulty
behavior in the system, e.g., latent, cascading, multi-point, and common-cause failures.
With the expressive modeling elements of the aforementioned languages, we can model complex
safety mechanisms. We use variables and arithmetic expressions to describe the complex decision-
making algorithms in the reconfiguration strategies and the sensor fusion algorithms. In addition, para-
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metric events in statechart interfaces can model both the communication and the fault propagation be-
tween the components.
We propose a top-down, three-step approach for the modeling of the EPAS system based on both the
system models and safety requirements. In Step I, the high-level states and components of the system
are defined, which is followed by Step II, the specification of safety mechanisms. Finally, in Step III, el-
ementary hardware components are modeled.
I. System-level behavior In the first step, we model the high-level state of the system from the per-
spective of functional and extra-functional requirements. Thus, we create the system statechart (depicted
in Figure 4), which contains the operating and failure states of the EPAS, namely, Normal, Loss of Assist
and Self-steering.
After that, we define a composition model of the system, which contains communication channels
between the communication ports of each statechart model. Error events and reconfiguration events
propagate from the lower-level components (e.g., hardware and safety mechanisms) to the higher-level
components (e.g., the system-level statechart) according to the semantics of the Gamma Composition
Language.
Components are represented by statecharts, which will be acquired or defined in the subsequent
modeling steps. The composed model describes the behavior of the full system, while engineers can
focus on the different statechart models at the appropriate levels of abstraction for top-down (deductive)
analysis. This model contains every component of the system, the failure of which can contribute to the
failure of the whole system and defines how they can interact with each other. The error propagation
model of the EPAS ECU is depicted in Figure 5.
II. Safety-level behavior In the second step, we specify the behavior of the safety mechanisms using
the statechart models created by the systems engineers. In our analysis, these models were already
available as part of the engineering models of the system.
The state of the EPAS ECU is determined by the state of the motor controllers. Consequently, the
system statechart is connected to the statechart models of the controllers (depicted in Figure 7). This
controller switches off the actuation if either the uC is faulty or the sensor diagnostic sends an error
status message. Consequently, the behavior of a controller is affected greatly by the behavior of the di-
agnostic function. Therefore, the controller statechart is connected to a diagnostic statechart (depicted in
Figure 8), which defines the voting mechanism in the diagnostic function. Note that the expressive mod-
eling elements of statecharts, such as orthogonal regions, variables, and arithmetic expressions greatly
facilitate the specification of the complex behavior of the sensor diagnostics.
III. Hardware-level behavior In the last step, we model the elementary hardware subcomponents of
the system, which are the smallest portion of hardware components considered in the safety analysis.
These hardware components have an independent and distinct functionality from the perspective of the
safety analysis. We can model these hardware elements with statecharts, which contain the operating
and failure modes of the hardware components. Such statecharts can be created based on standards [13],
supplier information, and the result of other analysis methods, e.g., FMEDA.
Generally, the statecharts of most hardware components, such as the uC in the ECU (Figure 10), have
only two states: a Good and a Faulty. Although, in the case of complex adaptive systems, the failure
mode greatly influences the state of the system. The sensor (Figure 9) has an operational state and two
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vastly different failure states: Shutdown and Drift. The Shutdown state can cause only Loss of assist
failure whereas the Drift state is the only source of the Self-steering failure.
3.2 Composite model
The statechart models introduced in Steps I, II, and III are composed into a single, deterministic, state-
based model of the system according to the composition model defined in Step I.
The semantics of the composition are defined by the Gamma framework and are similar to composi-
tion facilities provided by SysML block diagrams, Extended Timed Automata, and tools like UPPAAL,
albeit with support for ports, interfaces, and various synchronous and asynchronous communication se-
mantics. For a description of the semantics, we direct the interested reader to [11, 19], and Appendix A.
As an example of event propagation in the composite model of the system, consider the transitions to
the states named SelfSteering in the system level statechart in Figure 4 and motor controller in Figure 7.
Entry to the SelfSteering state in any of the two instances of the motor controller statechart, which
correspond to the two redundant uCs of the EPAS, raises the event selfsteering on their respective Monitor
ports. The system-level statechart listens to these events on its MonitorA and MonitorB ports, which are
connected to outputs of the two controllers. Any of these events trigger the transition from the Operation
state to the SelfSteering state, and raise the SS event on the Eval port, signalling the safety goal violation.
3.3 Fault distributions
In order to model not only the functions and services of the system but also its extra-functional aspects
(including reliability and availability), we have to affix fault occurrence distributions to the low-level
hardware faults in our model.
The Yakindu and Gamma modeling languages cannot express stochastic behaviors. Therefore, we
model the stochastic transitions separately, by annotating them in an external table (see Table 2). Dur-
ing simulation-based analysis, the distributions are sampled to generate (timed) fault sequences, which
are input to the composite state-based model as a sequence of low-level hardware events. Safety goal
violations can be ascertained as output events from the model.
4 Analysis of the system
In this section, we present an analysis method for deterministic, state-based composite models annotated
by fault distribution, which can be obtained using the methodology in the previous section.
Our analysis is based on deep probabilistic programming. While probabilistic programs, such as the
PRISM guarded command language, are widely used in reliability analysis, to our best knowledge, this
is the first use of an inference engine with observe statements for conditional reliability analysis and
distribution fitting.
4.1 Probabilistic Runtime Environment
In order to analyze the composite model of the system with randomly sampled fault sequences using
deep probabilistic programming, we created a bridge between the state-based model and the probabilis-
tic programming environment, called the Probabilistic Runtime Environment (PRE). This environment
allows running the state-based model as part of a deep probabilistic program. The PRE can be executed
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on its own to compute the mean lifetime of the system, or as part of a probabilistic program containing
observe statements to facilitate conditional analysis and distribution fitting for inference.
PRE is implemented in Python to be compatible with the most popular stochastic analysis tools
[4, 7, 22]. The implementation is built on top of the Pyro language, since Pyro includes the inference
algorithms needed for the analysis (summarized in Section 2.4), as well as state-of-the-art inference
tools, such as GPU accelerated deep probabilistic programming.
4.2 Translation to a probabilistic program
Discrete models are defined in the Gamma framework, out of which a Java implementation is generated.
This implementation can evaluate the system-level effects of the hardware faults via interface functions.
The model of the system is then directly translated into a probabilistic program that simulates random
hardware faults and the system behavior.
Our approach is based on continuous-time, asynchronous simulation. The probabilistic program
generates the component failure events randomly for all failure modes of all components in the system
at once. Thus, we sample each failure-mode distribution for each component and arrange the resulted
events in chronological order to produce a stochastic event series for the discrete model, which deter-
mines the failure-time and failure-mode. However, the number of possible failure combinations grows
exponentially with the number of hardware components in the system. Pyro provides several algorithms
that can mitigate this problem, such as interest sampling and SVI.
The pseudo-code of the probabilistic simulator program is shown in Algorithm 1. This algorithm
consists of the following steps:
1. First, the fault distribution of every failure mode of every hardware component is sampled and
collected into the fault set.
2. Then, the fault events are arranged in chronological order to get fault series. This procedure is
essential for our reliability assessment since, during a simulation, each fault event is sent to the
model of the software components individually.
3. Finally, the result of a component failure series is evaluated in a while loop. If the system reaches a
failure state during the evaluation cycle, the while lopp stops, and the simulation returns with both
the failure state and the elapsed time to reach the failure state.
All of these steps are integrated into the simulate function of the PRE. As a result, the generated prob-
abilistic program is available for the analysis scripts, which can both validate the system requirements
and identify the weak points in the system.
4.3 Stochastic analysis of the case study
4.3.1 Lifetime prediction
To predict the time to failure (TFF) of the system, the probabilistic program in Algorithm 1 can be run
repeatedly to sample from the TFF distribution and estimate the MTFF by stochastic model checking
methods [5]. The results were visualized in a histogram (see Figure 3).
To reveal the aging of the failures of the EPAS, we performed Weibull analysis [1] using stochastic
variational inference (SVI) from Pyro as outlied in Section 2.4. We set q{η ,β}(time)=Weibull(η ,β ; time)
as the guide function, where Weibull(η ,β ; time) is the pdf of a Weibull distributed random variable with
η and β scale and shape parameters respectively. In this case, the set of conditioned variables is empty,
i.e., x= /0, since we use neither conditioning nor the observe statement.
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The SVI optimization algorithm in the PRE explores the optimal Weibull shape (β ) and scale (η)
parameters, which reveals the fitted lifetime distribution. This method helps to understand the changes
in the failure rate of the system over time, as indicated by the shape parameter β .
4.3.2 Conditional analysis
For safety assessment, we can examine even complex, low-probability events in the system-under-
analysis, such as the MTTF in case of a specified failure mode. By utilizing the Pyro deep probabilistic
programming algorithm inside the PRE, we are able to analyze joint as well as conditional distributions.
We can use all the inference algorithms implemented in Pyro (e.g., importance sampling, Hamiltonian
Mont-Carlo, and SVI) to analyze efficiently complex conditional and parametric distributions even with
low occurrence probability [20].
To apply these inference algorithms, we first have to create a posterior model in the PRE, namely, a
conditional simulation model. In this model, we assume that some random variables in the simulation
will have a specified value (e.g., we assume that the system will go to a specified failure mode state).
In order to create such a model, we put observe statements for each conditioned random variable in
the generated simulate function. Thereafter, we either put the conditional simulation model into a Pyro
inference algorithm and run Monte Carlo simulations or we use the model fitting (SVI) algorithm of Pyro
(introduced in the previous subsection) with an appropriate guide function.
The conditional analysis can be used for component sensitivity calculations. The main objective of
this method is to investigate how the lifetime of the system changes if a given component fails. We
created a conditional model where we assume (observe) that a given component fails during the mission
time. Thus, the weaknesses of the system design could be identified and remedied.
5 Evaluation
5.1 Compatibility with ISO 26262 safety analysis requirements
The safety analysis of critical components has to be approved by several industry-specific standards.
Therefore, we defined our analysis method in accordance with the ISO 26262-2018 standard as it is one
of the most modern and relevant standards. In the following, we present the conformity between our
method and the ISO 26262:
• Our analysis technique supports system development in the full life-cycle, including the examina-
tion of new ideas with modular analysis even when the system model is incomplete.
• If the safety requirements are not fulfilled, we can construct a conditional analysis, which can
identify the weaknesses of the system design. Moreover, with the help of the Gamma framework,
we are able to functionally analyze the components of the system separately.
• The use of our analysis method does not require any special competences. Thus the safety analysis
can be an integrated part of the development process. As a result, statechart-based component
models can be reviewed directly by the engineers, and the engineers by themselves are able to
create component models without any training.
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(a) Comparison of the simulated and fitted lifetime
distribution (b) Comparison of the lifetime distribution of the fail-
ure modes
Figure 3: Lifetime prediction and conditional lifetime prediction with simulation
5.2 Analysis of the EPAS ECU
5.2.1 Lifetime prediction
We ran 10,000 independent simulations in the PRE and visualized the results in Figure 3a with the blue
histogram. As can be seen, the results resemble the characteristics of the Weibull distribution. Thus,
using the Pyro optimizers and SVI, we can fit a Weibull distribution to the system behavior, as shown in
Listing 3. We ran 10,000 steps with the SVI algorithm to fit the model. The comparison of the real and
the fitted Weibull model is depicted in Figure 3a, where the fitted Weibull model is represented with the
orange chart. As can be seen, the resulting model is not perfect, but it gives a good approximation for
the scale and the shape parameters. These parameters give an insight into how the system changes over
time. In addition, the parameters may be used for system-level analysis, including all subsystems of the
car.
To validate the results, we also conducted a fault tree analysis (FTA) manually on the EPAS model.
As it is depicted in Figure 3a, the results of the FTA matched those of simulation closely.
5.2.2 Conditional lifetime prediction
The ISO26262 standard requires a detailed analysis of the failure modes, therefore we have to analyze
the conditional behavior, the Uncontrolled self-steering and the Loss of assist failure modes from the
perspective of the expected occurrence time.
We created two conditional models in the PRE that give us the posterior distribution of the lifetime,
assuming that the failure mode is Loss of assist or Uncontrolled self-steering. The associated Pyro
probabilistic program is illustrated in Listing 4. We ran the inference algorithm 10,000 times. The
comparison of the two resulted posterior lifetime distributions are depicted in Figure 3b. The results meet
the expectations, Uncontrolled self-steering occurs much earlier than Loss of assist due to the following
reason: if a sensor has a latent failure and any other sensor has any kind of problem, the system will go
to state Uncontrolled self-steering immediately. The Loss of assist failure mode occurs when both sides
have a uC fault or three sensors have Shutdown type faults. Reaching Loss of assist takes a much longer
time than Uncontrolled self-steering.
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#microcontrollers 2 2 4 4
#sensors 6 12 24 48
Estimated state-space size 1020 1040 1060 1080
TTF analysis time (sec) 20.8 33.3 49.6 89.7
Conditional TTF analysis time (sec) 82.9 122.6 201.3 449.1
Table 1: Running time of the benchmark model simulations in seconds
5.3 Run-time measurements of the algorithms
In order to validate our analysis method, we made several run time measurements. We examined the
time-to-failure analysis as well as the conditional time-to-failure analysis. We ran all analysis scripts five
times and calculated the median and checked the consistency of the results.
We evaluated our analysis method on several different models. We used the EPAS, defined in Sec-
tion 1.1, as a template of the benchmark models. Thus we created three new versions of this model. Each
new model version was extended with some additional sensors and some new uCs. Similarly to the orig-
inal EPAS model, each uC has a voting mechanism for their sensors, and the system goes to state Loss
of assist if no uC is operational and goes to state Uncontrolled self-steering if at least one of them uses
bad sensor-data for the steering control. For the measurements, we used an average PC configuration5.
Median running times of the analyses are presented in Table 1.
The results show that the run-time of a single simulation scales well as the size of the model increases
and the analysis method can be applied even for large models.
The results of the run time measurements are depicted in Table 1. Note that all analysis scripts run
successfully within 10 minutes.
6 Conclusion
The top-down analysis of adaptive critical embedded automotive systems is a challenging task due to the
high redundancy in the hardware and the applied complex reconfiguration strategies in the software. Tra-
ditional modeling and analysis methods do not support the sensor fusion algorithms, the fail-operational
adaptation, and the dependent failures. In this work, we introduced a new top-down analysis approach
based on the Gamma framework and extended it with stochastic distributions. For the analysis, we cre-
ated a PRE, which provides an easy-to-use interface even for complex analysis techniques, e.g., SVI.
Finally, we applied the implemented algorithms on a power-steering model from the automotive indus-
try, and the results show that our algorithm scales well even for large models. Subject to future work, we
plan to include the analysis of the sensor fusion algorithms and system effects on the hardware failures,
where the modeled controller can optionally modify the failure/environmental distributions.
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A Gamma composition semantics
Gamma is a modeling framework for the semantically precise composition of statechart components.
Statecharts (considered as atomic components) can be composed in the Gamma Composition Language
(GCL), which supports the definition of synchronous and asynchronous composite components, two
fundamentally different system types determining how their constituent components receive events and
how they are executed. In the subsequent sections, we informally introduce the communication elements
in GCL as well as the cascade composition mode of synchronous systems, as we used this composition
mode for defining the EPAS configuration. Additional information on the synchronous and cascade
composition modes, as well as asynchronous systems, can be found in [11].
A.1 Communication Elements
In GCL, components (both atomic and composite) communicate through ports. Each port defines a point
of service through which certain event notifications can be sent or received. An event notification (or
event for short) is a piece of information passed between components, which can also have parameters
to forward data. An event is called message in the case of asynchronous components and signal in the
case of synchronous components. Events are declared on interfaces, which may be realized by ports. An
event may be declared as input or output. The declared directions are reversed, however, if the port does
not provide, but require the interface, which are the two possible modes in which a port can realize an
interface.
A.2 Synchronous components
Synchronous components represent models that communicate in a synchronous manner using signals.
They are executed in a lockstep fashion, triggered by an enclosing component (synchronous or asyn-
chronous) or an external actor from the environment. When executed, synchronous components process
incoming signals and produce output signals in accordance with their internal states. Input signals are
not queued but sampled: upon execution, the component can access the most recent signal for each event
on every port since the last execution (if there is any). Similarly, output signals are reset at the beginning
of every execution and each output event on every port can get a new signal assigned to it.
Synchronous components in Gamma are statechart definitions, which are considered atomic compo-
nents as well as synchronous and cascade composite components, which can be freely mixed in hierar-
chically composed synchronous systems.
A.3 Cascade composite components
Conceptually, components in a cascade composite model represent a set of “filters” through which inputs
are transformed into outputs. Therefore, constituent components immediately see the output signals of
other components in the same composite component during execution. By default, constituent compo-
nents are executed once in the order of their instantiation. Alternatively, an execution list can be defined
that determines the execution order of instantiated components. The execution list can contain a partic-
ular constituent component many times, supporting repeated execution. The typical arrangement of a
cascade composite component definition is illustrated in the following snippet.
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 
cascade Epas [
// System po r t d e c l a r a t i o n s
por t S1AFault : r e q u i r e s Sen so rFau l t
// . . .
] {
// Component i n s t a n c e s
component S1A : S en s o r S t a t e c h a r t
component DiagA : D i a g n o s t i c S t a t e c h a r t
// . . .
// B ind ing compos i t e model p o r t s to i n t e r n a l p o r t s
bind S1AFault−>S1A . HWFault
// . . .
// Channel d e f i n i t i o n s conne c t i n g i n t e r n a l p o r t s :
// A p ro v i d ed and r e q u i r e d r e a l i z a t i o n o f the same i n t e r f a c e
channe l [ S1A . S en s o rFau l t ] −o )− [ DiagA .S1HW]
// . . .
} 
Listing 1: The textual representation of a typical Gamma cascade composite component
B Models
B.1 System layer
Figure 4: System level statechart of the EPAS
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Figure 5: Layered structure of the EPAS model. Labels on arrows refer to the interfaces which define the
propagated error and reconfiguration events 
package epas
import ” i n t e r f a c e s / I n t e r f a c e s . gcd”
cascade Epas [
por t Sta t e : p ro v i d e s Eva l
por t S1AFault : r e q u i r e s Sen so rFau l t
por t S2AFault : r e q u i r e s Sen so rFau l t
por t S3AFault : r e q u i r e s Sen so rFau l t
por t S1BFault : r e q u i r e s Sen so rFau l t
por t S2BFault : r e q u i r e s Sen so rFau l t
por t S3BFault : r e q u i r e s Sen so rFau l t
por t UCAFault : r e q u i r e s UCFault
por t UCBFault : r e q u i r e s UCFault
] {
component S1A : S en s o r S t a t e c h a r t
component S2A : S en s o r S t a t e c h a r t
component S3A : S en s o r S t a t e c h a r t
component S1B : S en s o r S t a t e c h a r t
component S2B : S en s o r S t a t e c h a r t
component S3B : S en s o r S t a t e c h a r t
component DiagA : D i a g n o s t i c S t a t e c h a r t
component DiagB : D i a g n o s t i c S t a t e c h a r t
component UCA: UCStatechar t
component UCB: UCStatechar t
component ACTRL: Ma i n c t r l S t a t e c h a r t
component BCTRL: Ma i n c t r l S t a t e c h a r t
component Ev : E v a l u a t i o n S t a t e c h a r t
bind S1AFault−>S1A . HWFault
bind S2AFault−>S2A . HWFault
bind S3AFault−>S3A . HWFault
bind S1BFault−>S1B . HWFault
bind S2BFault−>S2B . HWFault
bind S3BFault−>S3B . HWFault
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bind UCAFault−>UCA. HWFault
bind UCBFault−>UCB. HWFault
bind State−>Ev . Eva l
channe l [ S1A . S en s o rFau l t ] −o )− [ DiagA .S1HW]
channe l [ S2A . S en s o rFau l t ] −o )− [ DiagA .S2HW]
channe l [ S3A . S en s o rFau l t ] −o )− [ DiagA .S3HW]
channe l [ S1B . S en s o rFau l t ] −o )− [ DiagB .S1HW]
channe l [ S2B . S en s o rFau l t ] −o )− [ DiagB .S2HW]
channe l [ S3B . S en s o rFau l t ] −o )− [ DiagB .S3HW]
channe l [ DiagA . D iagnos t i cOutpu t ] −o )− [ACTRL . D iagnos t i cOutpu t ]
channe l [ DiagA . D i a g n o s t i c S t a t u s ] −o )− [ACTRL . D i a g n o s t i c S t a t u s ]
channe l [ DiagB . D iagnos t i cOutpu t ] −o )− [BCTRL . D iagnos t i cOutpu t ]
channe l [ DiagB . D i a g n o s t i c S t a t u s ] −o )− [BCTRL . D i a g n o s t i c S t a t u s ]
channe l [UCA. Fau l t ] −o )− [ACTRL .UCHW]
channe l [UCB. Fau l t ] −o )− [BCTRL .UCHW]
channe l [ACTRL . Monitor ] −o )− [ Ev . AMonitor ]
channe l [BCTRL . Monitor ] −o )− [ Ev . BMonitor ]
} 
Listing 2: Gamma textual model of the EPAS configuration
 
i n t e r f a c e UCFault {
out event shutdown
}
i n t e r f a c e Sen so rFau l t {
out event det
out event l a t e n t
}
i n t e r f a c e D i a gn o s t i c S t a t u s {
out event E r r o r
out event Warning
} 
 
i n t e r f a c e Eva l {
out event SS
out event SLoA
}
i n t e r f a c e Diagnos t i cOutput {
out event WrongOutput
}
i n t e r f a c e Monitor {
out event warn ing
out event l o a
out event s e l f s t e e r i n g
} 
Figure 6: Gamma textual models of the EPAS interfaces
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B.2 Safety layer
Figure 7: Statechart of the motor controller
Figure 8: Statechart of the sensor diagnostics
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B.3 Hardware layer
Figure 9: Statechart based failure model of the sensor
Figure 10: Statechart based failure model of the uC sensor
Failure distribution Distribution parameters HW statechart From state To state
Weibull
concentration=1.5,
scale=0.1·10−9 1h
uC On Off
Exponential rate=10.0 ·10−9 1h Sensor Ok Off
Exponential rate=1.0 ·10−9 1h Sensor Ok LatentFailure
Table 2: Connection between the distributions and the state transitions in the case-study
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C Probabilistic Runtime Environment
Algorithm 1 Pseudo code of the translated probabilistic program
faults← /0
for all component ∈ system do
for all failure mode ∈ component do
fault time← sample(failure mode.distribution)
faults←{〈fault time;component; failure mode〉}∪ faults
end for
end for
faults← orderByTime(faults)
state← ”Normal”
while state == ”Normal” do
fault← faults.next()
state← GammaModel.getResultOf(fault.component, fault.failure mode)
end while
return {fault.time; state}
 
# I n s t a n t i a t e the gene r a t ed P r o b a b i l i s t i c Runtime Envi ronment
s imu l a t e = c r e a t e p r u ( )
# The gu ide f u n c t i o n encodes the f i t t e d d i s t r i b u t i o n
def gu ide ( ) :
s c a l e = pyro . param ( ” s c a l e ” , t o r ch . t e n s o r ( 1 . 0 ) , c o n s t r a i n t=c o n s t r a i n t s . p o s i t i v e )
shape = pyro . param ( ” shape ” , t o r ch . t e n s o r ( 1 . 0 ) , c o n s t r a i n t=c o n s t r a i n t s . p o s i t i v e )
pyro . sample ( ” f a i l u r e t i m e ” , d i s t . We ibu l l ( s c a l e , shape ) )
# Set up SVI w i th the Adam op t im i z e r
o p t im i z e r = pyro . opt im .Adam({ ” l r ” : 0 . 05 , ” be t a s ” : ( 0 . 9 , 0 . 999 ) })
s v i = pyro . i n f e r . SVI ( s imu l a t e , gu ide , op t im i z e r , l o s s=pyro . i n f e r . Trace ELBO ( ) )
n s t e p s = 500
f o r s t e p i n range ( n s t e p s ) :
s v i . s t e p ( )
# Ex t r a c t nume r i c a l s o l u t i o n
s c a l e = pyro . param ( ” s c a l e ” ) . i tem ( )
shape = pyro . param ( ” shape ” ) . i tem ( ) 
Listing 3: Probabilistic program for Weibull distribution fitting with SVI 
# I n s t a n t i a t e the gene r a t ed P r o b a b i l i s t i c Runtime Envi ronment
s imu l a t e = c r e a t e p r u ( )
# F a i l u r e mode 0 ( pas sed to t o r ch . t e n s o r ) c o r r e s pond s to s e l f −s t e e r i n g
c o n d i t i o n a l = pyro . c o n d i t i o n ( s imu l a t e , {” f a i l u r e mod e ” : t o r ch . t e n s o r ( 0 . 0 ) })
samp le r = pyro . i n f e r . Impor tance ( c o n d i t i o n a l , num samples=10000)
# Genera te a h i s tog ram o f the c o n d i t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n
m a r g i n a l d i s t = pyro . i n t e r . Emp i r i c a lMa r g i n a l ( samp le r . run ( ) , s i t e s=” f a i l u r e t i m e ” ) 
Listing 4: Probabilistic program for conditional analysis
